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Abstract
Capitalization levels in the property-liability insurance industry have increased dramatically in recent
years—the capital-to-assets ratio rose from 25% in 1989 to 35% by 1999. This paper investigates the use
of capital by insurers to provide evidence on whether the capital increase represents a legitimate
response to changing market conditions or a true inefficiency that leads to performance penalties for
insurers. We estimate “best practice” technical, cost, and revenue frontiers for a sample of insurers over
the period 1993–1998, using data envelopment analysis, a non-parametric technique. The results indicate
that most insurers significantly over-utilized equity capital during the sample period. Regression analysis
provides evidence that capital over-utilization primarily represents an inefficiency for which insurers incur
significant revenue penalties.
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Optimal Capital Utilization By Financial Firms:
Evidence From the Property-Liability Insurance Industry

Abstract
This paper investigates the use of equity capital in the property-liability insurance industry. The
objective is to determine whether the sharp decline in leverage over the past fifteen years
represents the over-utilization of capital or a rational response to changing market conditions.
Using best practice technical, cost, and revenue frontiers, estimated using data envelopment
analysis (DEA), we estimate each insurer’s optimal capital utilization, which we compare with
actual capital utilization. We conclude that measured capital over-utilization represents a true
inefficiency which adversely affects firm financial performance. We also find that the decline in
leverage was primarily attributable to capital gains on investments and provide evidence that
insurers are reluctant to pay out capital accumulations as dividends, even if it means overutilizing capital.

Optimal Capital Utilization By Financial Firms:
Evidence From the Property-Liability Insurance Industry
1. Introduction
Financial firms such as insurers and banks differ from most other types of firms in the economy in that
their debt-holders are also their principal customers. The debt-holder/customers rely on these financial
institutions to protect their assets in the case of banks and life insurers and to pay contingent claims in the case of
property-liability insurers. These debt-holder/customers thus are more concerned about insolvency risk than the
debt-holders of other types of firms, who are willing to accept a higher rate of investment return in return for
higher default risk. There is a market penalty for being a risky bank or insurer both in terms of product pricing
and in terms of the potential loss of risk-averse customers if insolvency risk is perceived as excessive. To
maintain insolvency risk at acceptable levels, financial institutions hold equity capital. However, holding capital
in a financial institution is costly because of factors such as regulatory costs, agency costs, informational
asymmetries, and corporate income taxation. Hence, institutions do not hold sufficient capital to eliminate
insolvency risk. Rather, market-driven ”safe” or ”adequate” levels of capital are held by most financial firms. 1
The puzzle in the property-liability insurance industry is why capitalization has risen to unprecedented
levels in recent years.

The ratio of premiums written to surplus, the industry’s standard leverage index,

traditionally fluctuated around an average level of approximately 2.0. Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, the
ratio began a precipitous decline and was less than 1.0 at the end of 1999. Likewise, the equity capital-to-asset
ratio, traditionally around 25 percent, increased to 35 percent by 1999. These developments have raised
questions about whether the industry is over-capitalized or whether structural changes in the insurance and/or
capital markets have driven the industry to higher capitalization.
The objective of this paper is to analyze capitalization in the industry to provide new information on
whether the industry is over-utilizing capital. We employ a frontier efficiency approach to analyze capital
utilization of property-liability insurers over the period 1993-1998. 2 Using data envelopment analysis (DEA), a
non-parametric technique, we estimate ”best practice” technical, cost, and revenue frontiers, and measure the
efficiency of each firm in the sample relative to the frontiers, producing estimates of technical, allocative, cost,

and revenue efficiency.
A key concept that we use in analyzing the issue of insurer capital utilization is that of cost efficiency,
which measures the firm’s success in minimizing costs. Cost efficiency is defined as the ratio of the costs that
would be incurred by a fully efficient firm to the costs actually incurred by the firm. Thus, fully efficient firms
have cost efficiency of 1, and inefficient firms have cost efficiency between 0 and 1. Cost efficiency can be
decomposed into technical efficiency and allocative efficiency.

Technical efficiency measures the firm’s

success in using state-of-the art technology, i.e., in operating on the production frontier. Allocatively efficiency
measures the firm’s success in choosing the cost minimizing combination of inputs conditional on output
quantities and input prices. To be fully cost efficient, a firm must operate with full technical and allocative
efficiency. We also estimate revenue efficiency, which measures the firm’s success in maximizing revenues,
and is defined as the firm’s actual revenues divided by the revenues of a fully efficient firm with the same
quantity of inputs. Like cost efficiency, technical, allocative, and revenue efficiency equal 1 for fully efficient
firms and are between 0 and 1 for inefficient firms.
The concept of allocative efficiency provides a natural way to analyze whether insurers are over or
under-utilizing capital because this efficiency concept specifically measures whether firms are choosing the
correct quantities of inputs to produce their outputs and produces estimates of the optimal input quantities for
each firm in the sample. By comparing the actual capital for a given firm with its optimal capital, we can
determine whether the firm is under or over-utilizing capital relative to the capital that would be used by a fully
efficient firm with the same quantity of outputs.
There are two possible reasons why firms may be measured as under or over-utilizing capital in our
DEA analysis. The first possibility is that measured under or over-optimal utilization of capital represents a
rational response to market factors or firm organizational characteristics that legitimately require differential
capital utilization. If this explanation is correct, a firm’s performance should not be adversely affected by
differences between its actual capital and its measured optimal capital. The second possible explanation is that
measured under or over-utilization of capital represents a true inefficiency which degrades firm performance. To
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provide information on which explanation is correct, we regress revenue efficiency scores and book-value
returns on equity against a set of explanatory variables, including the ratio of the firms’ optimal capital-to-assets
and the ratio of its actual minus optimal capital-to-assets. The latter ratio, which we call the sub-optimal
capital-to-assets ratio, represents the amount of capital under or over-utilization relative to assets.
The ratio of optimal capital-to-assets is expected to be positively related to revenue efficiency, i.e.,
firms are predicted to be rewarded with additional revenues for holding the optimal amount of capital. If
measured capital under or over-utilization represents legitimate usage of capital, the sub-optimal
capital-to-assets ratio will be positively related to revenue efficiency. However, if measured under or
over-utilization captures true inefficiencies, the sub-optimal capital-to-assets ratio is expected to be unrelated or
negatively related to revenue efficiency, providing evidence that firms are penalized by the insurance market for
holding sub-optimal levels of capital.
With respect to return on equity, financial theory predicts that firms with relatively more equity (lower
leverage) are less risky and thus should have lower costs of capital. Consequently, we expect the ratio of
optimal capital-to-assets to have a negative coefficient in the return on equity regressions. If holding additional
capital is a rational strategy, the ratio of sub-optimal capital-to-assets is also expected to have a negative
coefficient of roughly the same magnitude as the coefficient of the optimal capital-to-assets variable. However,
if holding additional capital represents inefficiency, the marginal safety benefits of holding the additional capital
will be partially or fully offset by a market penalty for inefficiency. Hence, the sub-optimal capital-to-assets
ratio could be negative with a smaller (in absolute value) coefficient than the optimal capital-to-assets ratio or
conceivably insignificant or positively related to return on equity. An insignificant or smaller negative effect
would imply that firms are not rewarded commensurately for holding sub-optimal capital as they are for holding
the optimal amount of capital, and a positive coefficient would suggest that inefficient firms have higher costs of
capital than relatively more efficient firms.
In addition to measuring the effects of optimal and sub-optimal capital on firm performance, we specify
and test several hypotheses regarding the characteristics of firms that are likely to be associated with capital
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utilization. The tests are conducted by regressing the ratio of the firm’s actual-to-optimal capital against a
vector of explanatory variables representing the hypotheses. These tests enable us to control for differences
among firms that may help to explain observed patterns of capital utilization in the industry.
By way of preview, we find that the run-up in equity capital of the past decade is primarily attributable
to capital gains on investments. Further, we provide evidence that capital levels in the industry are ”sticky” in
the sense that insurers are reluctant to pay out capital accumulations as dividends, preferring to maintain internal
funds to cushion the next loss or investment shock. Finally, we find that insurers are substantially over-utilizing
equity capital and that the over-utilization represents inefficiency and leads to significant revenue and cost of
capital penalties and for inefficient firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an empirical overview of
capitalization trends in the property-liability insurance industry to provide background for the subsequent
discussion. In section 3, we formulate hypotheses about insurer capital structure. Section 4 describes our sample
and specifies the inputs and outputs used in the DEA analysis. In section 4, we discuss our hypotheses about
revenue efficiency and return on equity. Section 6 discusses our estimation methodology, and the results are
presented in section 7. Section 8 summarizes our findings and conclusions.

2. Capitalization Trends in Property-Liability Insurance
The leverage ratios for the property-liability insurance industry for the period 1970-1999 are graphed in
Figure 1. Two leverage ratios are shown – the ratio of net premiums written to equity capital and the equity
capital-to-asset ratio. The former is the traditional leverage ratio used in the industry, while the latter is used
more commonly in the financial literature. Both leverage ratios show that capitalization in the industry has
increased dramatically over the past fifteen years. The premiums to surplus ratio was near 2.0 in 1985 but then
began an almost uninterrupted decline to less than 1.0 by 1999. The capital-to-asset ratio, which stood at 25
percent in 1985, increased to 37 percent by 1999.
The trends in the leverage ratios are primarily due to growth in insurer equity capital. During the
ten-year period 1990-1999, equity capital growth averaged 10 percent per year (on a book basis), while
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premium growth was only about 3 percent per year. The divergent growth rates in capital and premiums are
shown in Figure 2, which graphs the six-year moving averages in the growth rates for these two variables.
Except for brief periods such as the mid-1980s, the growth rate in capital has far exceeded the growth rate in
premiums. During the 1990s, the capital growth in the industry tracks the bullish stock market (see further
discussion below).
What can possibly explain the dramatic changes in capital structure in this industry? There are several
possibilities, most of which are explored in more depth below:
(1) The introduction of a risk-based capital (RBC) system by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners in 1994. The introduction of the RBC system was widely anticipated and may have led insurers
to accumulate more capital to reduce the probability of incurring regulatory costs under the new system.
(2) The rise in importance of rating agencies. The insurance product market is known to react to ratings
downgrades by firms such as the A.M. Best Company, Standard & Poor’s, and Moody’s. For example, in the
commercial lines market, it is necessary for insurers to maintain at least an A rating in order to avoid losing
customers to competitors. The rating agencies have played a more aggressive role with respect to insurers
following the run-up in insurer insolvencies in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Thus, some insurers may have
accumulated additional capital to protect their financial ratings.
(3) The growth in the market for alternative risk transfer products, which provide an alternative to
conventional insurance. These include self insurance programs, captive insurance companies, and securitized
financial risk transfer instruments. These products have drained many of the more predictable risks out of
insurance markets, increasing the overall volatility of insurer liability portfolios. Additionally, the rise of the
alternative market has caused premium growth to stagnate, partially accounting for the gap between premium
and equity growth.
(4) An increased awareness by insurers of their exposure to catastrophic property losses coupled with
inadequate supply of reinsurance for such losses. Following hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the Northridge
earthquake in 1994, insurers revised upward their estimates of potential losses due to catastrophes such as
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hurricanes and earthquakes. Simultaneously, it became apparent that reinsurance for these large events was
inadequate (Swiss Re 1997, Froot 1999). Thus, insurers with significant catastrophe exposure may have added
capital to cushion catastrophic loss shocks.
(5) The 1990s bull market in corporate equities, combined with insurer reluctance to change capital
structure by increasing stockholder dividends. There is both theoretical and empirical evidence that there is
considerable ”stickiness” among insurers in adjusting dividends in response to increases in equity (Winter 1994,
Gron 1995, Cummins and Danzon 1997). The stickiness is driven by informational asymmetries that make it
difficult for insurers to raise capital after a loss or investment shock, inducing them to hold onto capital windfalls
in anticipation of the next underwriting crisis.
(6) Agency costs and other aspects of insurer organizational and market structure. These factors,
including the role played by mutual insurers, are discussed in more detail below.
Tracing the source of the industry’s growth in equity capital may provide some initial answers to the
capital structure puzzle. Table 1 breaks down the industry’s growth in book equity into its sources and uses for
the period 1989-1998. Section A of the table shows that total capital grew by $215.7 billion from 1989-1998,
net of $78.9 billion in stockholder dividends and $29.7 billion in miscellaneous outflows.

These capital

disbursements are added back to the net change in capital to give the gross change in capital in section B of the
table, and the percentages of the gross change from each source of capital are shown.
Capital gains provided the most important source of new capital during the ten-year period 1989-1998
and the five-year period 1994-1998 – accounting for 51.7 percent during the former period and 52.9 percent
during the latter. The second most important source of gross new capital is retained earnings other than capital
gains (net underwriting income plus investment income), and the third most important source is new capital
paid-in, either from new equity offerings or contributions from parent firms. The uses of the gross changes in
equity are shown in section C of the table. About two-thirds of the total gross change in capital is retained by
insurers, about one-fourth paid out as dividends, and the remainder devoted to miscellaneous uses.
Table 1 also provides some support for the capital stickiness hypothesis, i.e., that capital accumulates
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because insurers are concerned about the feasibility of raising new capital following the next major underwriting
or investment shock. The last column in section A of the table shows the dividend payout rate over the period,
i.e., the ratio of stockholder dividends paid to the total gross change in capital. The average payout rate is
actually lower in the second half of the sample period than during the first half, even though the second half of
the sample period accounted for about 70 percent of the total change in gross capital. This is consistent with the
view that insurers are reluctant to reduce capital during periods of capital growth by increasing the dividend
payout rate.
As a second look at the over-capitalization issue, we consider the annual market returns and volatilities
on a portfolio of property-liability insurance stocks and compare these statistics with the returns and volatilities
on the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 stock index. If insurers have been inefficiently utilizing capital, it might be
expected that their equity returns would suffer as a result. The portfolio of insurance stocks used in our analysis
consists of all firms in standard industrial classification (SIC) category 6330, property-liability insurers,
appearing in the CRSP database of New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ stocks.

The returns and

volatilities are based on an unweighted average of the SIC 6330 firms.
The results of the return and volatility comparisons are shown in Table 2. The table shows the fifteen
year period 1985-1999. The year 1985 was abnormal for property-liability insurers because it followed the
1984-1985 commercial liability insurance crisis, which caused a major adverse shock to equity capital for many
insurers. As the second year of the crisis, 1985 was in many respects a rebound year when the effects of
shock-induced insurance price increases first began to be realized. Accordingly, we show averages of returns
and volatilities over two sample periods: 1985-1999 and 1986-1999. Averages are also presented for the last
ten years and last five years of the sample period. The results indicate that insurance equity returns were higher
than the S&P 500 return in all sample periods except 1995-1999, while insurer volatilities are generally lower
than S&P 500 volatilities. The lower returns over the 1995-1999 period are primarily attributable to low returns
in 1998 and 1999. Thus, if insurers are over-capitalized, it does not show up in the stock return data for traded
firms, except possibly for the last two years of the sample period. 3

7

3. Hypotheses: Capital Structure and Leverage
In this section, we discuss economic factors that influence insurer decisions about capitalization and
formulate hypotheses about insurer capital structure based on financial theory. In addition to discussing the
rationale for insurers to hold capital, we also formulate hypotheses about firm characteristics likely to be
associated with over and under–capitalization.
Financial Distress
The costs of financial distress are a common friction identified as influencing capital decisions. As
insurers increase their capital relative to premiums or liabilities, the probability of insolvency declines, reducing
the associated expected costs of financial distress. However, holding capital in an insurance company is costly,
because of various frictions and market imperfections, including agency costs, regulatory costs, and corporate
income taxation (Merton and Perold 1993). Consequently, insurers do not hold sufficient capital to reduce the
probability of bankruptcy to negligible levels.
Financial distress occurs when an insurer has difficulty honoring commitments to policyholders and
other creditors. The associated costs include the transactions costs of bankruptcy, the loss of talented employees,
the loss of non-marketable and relationship-specific assets, reputation and relationship losses, and other losses to
the insurer’s franchise value. Further, insurance is priced as risky debt, and the prices an insurer’s products
command in the market are inversely related to the probability of bankruptcy (Cummins and Danzon 1998).
All else equal, as the expected costs of insolvency increase, the marginal benefit to capital increases,
and the optimal leverage ratio decreases. For an insurance company, the probability of insolvency is related to an
insurer’s ability to diversify the risk to their capital. As proxies for insolvency risk, three measures of liability
risk and one measure of asset risk are used.
The first measure of liability risk is the insurer’s diversification across geographical areas. Other things
being equal, an insurer that is more geographically diversified is expected to have lower insolvency risk than
insurers that are more concentrated geographically.

To measure geographical diversification we use a

Herfindahl index of insurer premium writings by state. 4 The second measure of liability risk is the insurer’s
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Herfindahl index across lines of insurance based on premium volume. Insurers that are more diversified by line
are expected to have lower insolvency risk than insurers concentrating on one or a few business lines. Lower
Herfindahl indices imply higher diversification and, consequently, the geographical and line of business
Herfindahl indices are predicted to be positively related to the use of capital.
The third measure of liability risk focuses on the insurer’s use of reinsurance. Because reinsurance
represents diversification among insurance companies, firms that purchase more reinsurance are expected to
have lower insolvency risk. Our measure of the intensity of an insurer’s reinsurance activities is the ratio of
ceded loss reserves to direct plus assumed loss reserves. 5 We predict an inverse relationship between the
reinsurance variable and the utilization of capital.
The measure of asset risk used in our analysis is the percentage of an insurer’s assets invested in stocks
and real estate, because these assets expose insurers to more volatility risk than their fixed income investments,
which tend to be highly rated bonds and notes. We expect a positive relationship between the percentage of
assets in stocks and real estate and the utilization of capital.
These propositions are stated formally in the following hypotheses.

H1 The Herfindahl indices of premiums written by state and by line of business will be positively
related to capital utilization.
H2 Firms with higher ratios of ceded loss reserves to direct plus assumed loss reserves will use less
capital.
H3 Firms with higher percentages of assets invested in stocks and real estate will use more capital.
Part of the increase in capitalization levels in the insurance industry may be attributable to changes in
the characteristics of insured risks. Buyers have substituted a variety of ”alternative risk transfer” mechanisms
for insurance, removing the more predictable risks and continuing to insure the more volatile risks such as
commercial liability claims. If insurer liability portfolios have become increasingly volatile, this could provide
an explanation of recent capitalization trends. Risk levels also are expected to differ cross-sectionally among
firms in the industry as a function of both underwriting and investment portfolio choices. To control for temporal
and cross-sectional differences in insurer income volatility, we use the standard deviation of each insurer’s
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book-value return on equity computed over the three years preceding each analysis year. We expect this
variable to be positively related to capitalization.

H4 Higher risk, as measured by the standard deviation of return on equity, will be associated with
higher capital utilization.
It is well known from statistical and actuarial theory that the average loss in a pool of risks becomes
more predictable as the number of risks in the pool increases. This means that the losses of larger insurers are
more predictable than those of smaller firms so that large firms should require relatively lower capitalizaation to
achieve a given level of insolvency risk. Although in principle smaller firms should be able to achieve similar
results through reinsurance, in practice reinsurance is costly due to frictions such as moral hazard, adverse
selection, and the need to provide a profit to the reinsurer. This suggests the following hypothesis:

H5 Capitalization will be inversely related to firm size.
Following the recent insurance efficiency literature (e.g., Cummins and Weiss 2000), we use the
natural log of assets to represent firm size.
Agency Costs
Two significant sources of agency costs exist in the insurance industry. Conflicts between owners and
managers arise because managers do not share fully in the residual claim held by owners and thus have an
incentive to behave opportunistically. Conflicts between owners and policyholders arise because policyholders’
claims to assets have legal priority over owners’ claims. Owners have an incentive to exploit policyholder
interests by changing the risk structure of the firm or taking other actions that increase the value of equity and
decrease the value of the policyholders’ debt claim on the firm.
The owner-manager conflict is a classic example of moral hazard, since the non-contractible effort of
the manager directly affects the value of the claim held by the owner. Without possessing a 100 percent
ownership stake, managers face a reduced marginal benefit from investing their effort into the firm, altering the
incentives for the manager to exert the optimal effort. This creates a significant agency cost that can be reduced
by increasing leverage. Holding constant the managers’ level of ownership, reducing equity capital increases the
managers’ stake in the firm, helping to align the interests of owners and managers. Reducing equity also
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decreases the amount of free cash available for managers to pursue private interests, such as perquisite
consumption. Finally, additional leverage increases the probability of bankruptcy (a particularly costly event for
managers), making private pursuits more costly for managers. Mitigating the conflict between managers and
owners constitutes a benefit from increased leverage.
When owners and policyholders are separate classes of investors, a conflict arises because owners have
a claim to firm value only beyond the claims of policyholders. Due to limited liability, equity ownership is
equivalent to a call option on the value of the firm, making risky investments attractive to owners. Since
policyholders bear much of the consequences of failed investments, policyholders prefer less risky investments.
When the opportunistic behavior of owners is anticipated, the effect is incorporated into the price of insurance,
and owners bear much of the cost of the incentive conflict. This cost can be reduced by decreasing leverage,
which mitigates the price effect by reducing insolvency risk. Further, increasing the amount of equity capital
relative to premiums reduces the benefit to owners from substituting riskier investments, making asset
substitution less attractive. Mitigating the conflict between policyholders and owners constitutes a benefit from
decreased leverage.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the optimal capital structure is determined by trading off the
benefits from increased leverage (mitigating the owner-manager conflict) with the benefits from decreased
leverage (mitigating the owner-policyholder conflict). When the owner-manager conflict is particularly severe,
firms may appear under-capitalized to the extent that agency costs are not fully reflected in the cost of capital
used in our efficiency analysis. When the owner-policyholder conflict is severe, firms may appear
over-capitalized.
Because the insurance industry is characterized by more than one ownership form, organizational form
provides an excellent proxy for the degree of agency costs inherent in an insurance firm. Compared with stock
companies, mutuals remove the owner-policyholder conflict by merging these two roles. However, the
owner-manager conflict is more severe in the mutual ownership form because the mechanisms available for
owners to control managers are much more limited than in the stock ownership form. To the extent that the costs
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of unresolved owner-manager conflicts are greater than the benefits from removing the policyholder-owner
conflict, mutuals are likely to face a higher effective cost of capital and will appear under-capitalized in the
efficiency analysis. Similarly, because the owner-policyholder conflict is eliminated in the mutual ownership
form, there is reduced marginal benefit to additional capital, providing an additional reason why mutuals may be
less capitalized than stocks. The prediction is summarized in the following hypothesis:

H6 Mutuals will utilize capital less intensively than stocks.
Due to the time lag between payment of premiums and payment of claims, insurance firm managers are
in control of policyholder funds for a significant period of time. This time lag offers managers the opportunity for
engaging in activities that provide private benefits, possibly to the detriment of the firm and policyholders. As
the policy length and claims tail increases, the problem worsens; and there is a benefit to removing excess funds
from the firm and increasing the bankruptcy probability. This can be accomplished by reducing capital and
increasing leverage. An insurer’s loss reserve and unearned premium reserve are liabilities for losses not yet
paid and premiums received for which service has not yet been provided. The ratio of the sum of loss and
unearned premium reserves to incurred losses is used as a proxy for time lag between policy issuance and the
payment of claims, with.higher ratios indicating longer tailed business. As this ratio increases, the marginal cost
of capital increases and firms are predicted to choose lower capital levels. Therefore, we hypothesize that:

H7 The ratio of reserves to losses incurred will be inversely related to capital utilization.
Asymmetric Information and Growth Opportunities
If corporate managers possess superior information about the nature of investment opportunities than do
owners, Myers and Majluf (1984) demonstrate that this information asymmetry may cause equity mis-pricing.
This results in a ”pecking order” theory of financing where managers prefer internal funds and debt to financing
through equity. As the degree of asymmetry between managers and investors increases, the mis-pricing problem
worsens and raising equity capital becomes more costly. For an insurer, there are two immediate consequences.
First, firms with more severe information asymmetries will become more leveraged over time, because raising
equity capital is more costly for such firms. Second, for any given degree of informational asymmetry, insurance
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firms with more growth opportunities are expected to hold additional capital to avoid the need for raising costly
capital in the future. Faster growth also increases uncertainty about future performance, so decreasing leverage
provides additional security to customers and investors that the new business will not change the default
probability. This suggests the following hypotheses:

H8 Firms with higher information asymmetries between managers and owners will utilize relatively
less equity capital.
H9 Firms with more growth opportunities will consume relatively more equity capital.
As a proxy for the degree of information asymmetries between managers and investors, the standard
deviation of return on equity (ROE) over time is used to capture the public information that is available to
investors. Insurers with low earnings volatility are assumed to possess assets and liabilities that change very
little over time, making their future profitability easily conveyed from manager to investor. However, insurers
with higher volatility have operations that are less predictable, and therefor have more severe information
asymmetries than less risky insurers. Such firms will find it more costly to generate equity capital and will
accumulate less over time. Based on this rationale, the coefficient of variation of ROE is predicted to be
inversely related to capitalization. Recall, however, that hypothesis H4 predicts a positive relationship between
ROE and capital, based on reduction of financial distress costs. Thus, the actual sign of this variable will
depend upon the extent to which it measures firm opacity versus aversion to financial distress costs.
As a proxy for growth opportunities, we use the one-year percentage growth rate in premiums. As the
measure of growth increases, it is hypothesized that insurers will be motivated to hold more capital to be able to
take advantage of growth opportunities using internal rather than external funds. Thus, the premium growth rate
is predicted to be positively related to capital utilization.
Product Market Interaction
Because the purpose of insurance is to diversify risk and indemnify policyholders for losses due to
contingent events, the insurance market is sensitive to insurer insolvency risk, and safer insurers command
higher prices. In addition, positive switching costs and private information possessed by the incumbent insurer
can create a significant advantage to remaining with the same insurer (Kunreuther and Pauly 1985, D’Arcy and
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Doherty 1989). This informational advantage augments the insurer’s franchise value, which is placed in
jeopardy if the probability of financial distress increases. Consequently, firms with more franchise value at
stake are expected to have lower leverage than firms with less at stake (Titman 1984).
Due to economies of scale and the existence of insurance brokers, corporate insurance buyers face
significantly lower switching costs than personal buyers, making relationships with corporate buyers more
fragile than those with personal buyers. The commercial lines insurance market is considered a ”commodity
market,” where buyers choose insurers on the basis of price, from the set of insurers with adequate (A or better)
financial ratings. Moreover, commercial lines buyers and their brokers are more proficient than individual
buyers in assessing insurer financial quality. This suggests the following hypothesis:

H10 Leverage will be inversely related to the percentage of an insurer’s revenues coming from
commercial lines of insurance.
To test this hypothesis, we include in the regressions the ratio of the insurer’s personal lines premiums
to total premiums. This variable is expected to be inversely related to capitalization.
Regulation
In response to an increase in insurer insolvencies in the 1980s and early 1990s, the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) instituted risk-based capital (RBC) requirements in 1994.
Insurers are assessed RBC charges for asset risk, credit risk, underwriting risk, and other miscellaneous risks.
The sum of the charges, after a covariance adjustment, constitutes the insurer’s risk-based capital. Various
regulatory actions are stipulated if the ratio of the insurer’s actual capital to risk-based capital falls below a
series of thresholds beginning at 200 percent. The introduction of risk-based capital thus created a ”regulatory
option” that reduced the market value of insurers. Because the option value is inversely related to capitalization,
the introduction of RBC is predicted to have increased capitalization levels in the industry. To control for
differences in capitalization by year, we include year dummy variables in our regression equation. If capital
levels were adjusted during or after the RBC introduction year (1994), the coefficients of the year dummy
variables may be larger in the later years of the sample period. On the other hand, if insurers anticipated the
introduction of RBC, then the primary adjustments may have occurred prior to our sample period and the year
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dummy variable coefficients will have no systematic pattern.

4. Hypotheses: Revenue Efficiency and Return on Equity
In addition to regressions to explain insurer capital structure, we also conduct regressions designed to
detect relationships between capital structure and firm performance. We use two indicators of performance —
revenue efficiency and book-value return on equity. Most of the variables discussed in the preceding section are
also relevant as hypothesis testing and control variables in the revenue efficiency and return on equity
regressions. In this section, we discuss hypotheses and expected signs for the firm performance regressions.
Revenue Efficiency
The primary purpose of the revenue efficiency analysis is to determine whether measured capital under
or over-utilization is a rational strategy that is rewarded by the market with additional revenues or a true
inefficiency which leads to revenue penalties.

The maintained hypothesis about the relationship between

capitalization and revenue efficiency is that insurance buyers are sensitive to insolvency risk but that insurance
market equilibrium occurs at a non-negligible probability of default. The primary reason is that holding equity
capital in an insurance company is costly because of frictions and market imperfections such as regulatory costs,
corporate income taxation, and unresolved agency conflicts. Thus, at some point, the marginal benefit of adding
capital to reduce insolvency risk falls below the marginal cost of the added capital.
The costly capital argument predicts that firms will be rewarded for holding the optimal amount of
capital. Firms will be rewarded or penalized for measured capital under or over-utilization depending upon
whether holding capital that deviates from the measured optimum represents a legitimate response to market
forces or a true inefficiency. Under or over-utilization does not represent a true inefficiency if capital utilization
patterns reflect legitimate differences in capital requirements across firms because of heterogeneity in
underwriting or investment portfolios, organizational form, or other factors. On the other hand, if deviations
from optimal represent a true inefficiency, insurers holding sub-optimal amounts of capital are likely to be
penalized by the market in terms of lower revenues, either because they hold too little capital and thus have
higher insolvency risk than buyers find desirable or because they hold too much capital and perhaps try to cover
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the dead-weight costs of the excess capital by charging prices that are viewed by buyers as too high.
To test the relationship between revenue efficiency and capital utilization, we specify two explanatory
variables – the ratio of optimal capital-to-assets and the ratio of actual minus optimal capital-to-assets. We refer
to the former variable as the optimal capital-to-asset ratio and to the latter as the sub-optimal capital-to-asset
ratio. The costly capital hypothesis unambiguously predicts a positive relationship between revenue efficiency
and the optimal capital-to-asset ratio, i.e., insurers that attain the optimal level of insolvency risk will be
rewarded with additional revenues. If measured capital under or over-utilization represents legitimate usage of
capital, the sub-optimal capital-to-assets ratio is expected to be positively related to revenue efficiency.
However, if measured under or over-utilization reflects inefficiency, the sub-optimal capital-to-assets ratio is
expected to be negatively related to revenue efficiency.
The explanatory variables discussed in the preceding section also are included in the revenue efficiency
regressions, primarily as control variables. In most cases, the expected signs of the explanatory variables are
ambiguous a priori. For example, the line of business Herfindahl index is predicted to have a negative sign
under the conglomeration hypothesis, which holds that it is value-maximizing for firms to offer multiple lines of
business, either because of diversification benefits or because buyers are willing to pay more for ”one-stop
shopping.” On the other hand, the strategic focus hypothesis, which holds that firms can maximize value
through focusing on one or a few lines of business where the firm has a comparative advantage, predicts that the
line of business diversification variable will have a positive sign, recalling that high Herfindahl indices imply
more concentration. 6 Likewise, the geographical Herfindahl index could have a positive or negative sign
depending upon whether focusing on a narrower geographical area allows the firm to become more
knowledgeable about the market and hence to build stronger relationships with customers versus reducing risk
exposure through diversification. Given that there are other variables in the equation relating more directly to
insolvency risk, a positive sign on the geographical Herfindahl may be more likely than a negative sign.
Interpreting asset risk as indicative of higher insolvency probabilities, we expect the ratio of stocks and real
estate to assets to be inversely related to revenue efficiency.
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Firm size is expected to be positively related to revenue efficiency if larger firms have lower insolvency
risk and/or are able to earn higher revenues because size conveys market power. The standard deviation of return
on equity could be negatively related to revenue efficiency, if it captures insolvency risk, or could be positively
related based on the financial theory argument that higher risk activities earn higher returns. The mutual dummy
variable is predicted to have a negative coefficient if mutuals are less efficient than stocks due to unresolved
agency conflicts. The premium growth rate is expected to have a positive sign if firms with more growth
opportunities tend to be more profitable. Finally, the proportion of personal lines output to total insurance output
is predicted to have a negative sign if commercial lines insurers have lower insolvency risk or have higher
value-added because of higher service intensity in the commercial lines.
Return on Equity
The return on equity (ROE) regressions are designed to provide additional information on the
relationship between firm performance and capitalization. Again, we seek to determine whether measured capital
under or over-utilization is a rational response to market forces or a true inefficiency.
Financial theory predicts that firms with relatively more equity (lower leverage) are less risky and thus
should have lower costs of capital. Consequently, to the extent that realized returns on equity are correlated with
the ex ante cost of capital, we expect the ratio of optimal capital-to-assets to have a negative coefficient in the
return on equity regressions. If holding additional capital above or below the measured optimum is a rational
strategy, the ratio of sub-optimal capital-to-assets is also expected to have a negative coefficient of roughly the
same magnitude as the coefficient of the optimal capital-to-assets variable. However, if holding additional
capital represents an inefficiency, the safety benefits of holding the additional capital will be partially or fully
offset by a market penalty for the inefficiency. Hence, the sub-optimal capital-to-assets ratio could be negative
with a smaller (in absolute value) coefficient than the optimal capital-to-assets ratio or conceivably insignificant
or positively related to return on equity. An insignificant or smaller negative effect would imply that firms are
not rewarded commensurately for holding sub-optimal capital as they are for holding the optimal amount of
capital, and a positive coefficient would suggest that inefficient firms have higher costs of capital than relatively
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more efficient firms.
Also included in an ROE regression is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if an insurer has a Best’s
rating of A or higher and equal to zero otherwise and the firm’s revenue efficiency score. To the extent that
highly rated firms can charge higher premiums because of buyer perceptions that they have lower insolvency
risk, we predict a positive coefficient for the Best’s rating indicator variable and ROE. The revenue efficiency
score is also predicted to be positively related to ROE because revenue efficient firms lose smaller proportions of
their revenues due to inefficiency, giving them higher ROEs, other things equal. The Best’s rating variable and
revenue efficiency are clearly jointly determined with ROE. Consequently, they are treated as endogenous
variables, using an instrumental variables approach discussed below.
The set of explanatory variables included in the actual-to-optimal capital and revenue efficiency
regressions also are included in the return on equity regressions. There are several unambiguous predictions
based on the financial theory relationship between risk and return.

If geographical and line of business

diversification reduce firm default risk, the coefficients on the geographical and line of business Herfindahl
indices are predicted to be positive in the return on equity regressions because higher Herfindahl indices imply
less diversification and a higher cost of capital. The ratio of stocks and real estate to total assets and the
standard deviation of return on equity also have predicted positive coefficients due to the hypothesized
relationship between risk and the cost of capital. Likewise, if buying more reinsurance reduces firm risk, our
reinsurance variable, the ratio of ceded loss reserves to direct plus assumed loss reserves, is predicted to be
inversely related to return on equity. Firms with more growth opportunities are likely to be viewed favorably by
capital markets, predicting a negative sign on the premium growth variable. Also, based on our argument that
commercial lines insurers will be relatively safe compared to personal lines insurers, we predict a positive
coefficient on the ratio of personal lines output to total insurance output.
The predicted sign of the size variable is ambiguous a prior. On the one hand, if larger firms are more
diversified than smaller firms, we would expect size to be inversely related to ROE. On the other hand, if larger
firms earn higher revenues due to market power, size could be positively related to ROE to the extent that ROE
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is correlated with the ex ante cost of capital. In this regard, it would reflect the firm’s earning economic rents
rather than a higher ex ante cost of capital. The predicted sign of the long tail lines variable (loss reserves
divided by losses incurred) is also ambiguous. If long-tail lines are more risky than short-tail lines and/or firms
with more long-tail business are more highly levered, a positive coefficient would be predicted. On the other
hand, long-tail lines are known to have lower underwriting profits than short-tail lines because long-tail
premiums have a higher discount for the time value of money. If this effect dominates, the long-tail lines
variable could have a negative coefficient in the ROE regressions. Finally, if mutual firms are more highly
levered than stocks, the mutual dummy variable is predicted to have a positive coefficient, but if mutual firms
write lower risk business than stock firms because they do not have access to capital markets in the event of a
loss shock, the mutual variable could have a negative coefficient.

5. Methodology
This section discusses the estimation methodologies used in our analysis of firm capital structure and
performance. We begin by discussing the economic efficiency concepts underlying our analysis, including pure
technical, scale, allocative, and cost efficiency. Next, we discuss the estimation of efficiency utilizing data
envelopment analysis (DEA). The section concludes with a discussion of the regression methodology that we
use to analyze capital structure and effects of under and over-capitalization on firm performance.
Efficiency
To analyze production frontiers, we utilize input-oriented distance functions as originally introduced by
Farrell (1957). Suppose producers use input vector x ! !x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x K " " ! # K$ to produce output vector
y ! !y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y M " " ! # M
$ . The production technology that transforms the K inputs into M outputs is
represented by the input correspondence V!y " !

x : !y, x " is feasible . The input-oriented distance function

for a specific decision making unit (DMU) is D!y, x " ! sup ! : x ! V!y " , which is the reciprocal of the
!
minimum equi-proportional contraction of the input vector x that can still produce y. Obviously, D!y, x " " 1.
The Farrell measure of input technical efficiency reflects the ability of a DMU to minimize required
inputs to produce a given output. It is defined as
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TE!y, x " !

1
! inf#! : !x ! V!y "$.
D!y, x"

The technical efficiency measure ! is equivalent to one minus the equi-porportional reduction in all
inputs that still allows production of the same outputs. It follows that TE!y, x " # 1. The Farrell
measure of technical efficiency is calculated with respect to a production frontier characterized by
constant returns to scale (CRS) and variable returns to scale (VRS). From an economic perspective,
firms should operate in a region of CRS, so total technical efficiency is given by Farrell efficiency with
respect to a CRS frontier, TE CRS !y, x ". Pure technical efficiency is given by Farrell efficiency with
respect to a VRS frontier, PTE!y, x" ! TE VRS !y, x ", and scale technical efficiency is given by the
remaining total inefficiency not explained by pure technical efficiency, SE!y, x" !

TE CRS !y, x"
, where
TE VRS !y, x"

SE!y, x" ! scale efficiency.
By explicitly modeling the economic objective of cost minimization, we can estimate the cost efficiency
of each DMU. When the economic objective is to minimize the costs associated with producing a given output,
then economic cost efficiency is measured by the ratio of minimum possible cost to actual observed cost.
Supposing producers face input prices w ! !w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w K " " ! # K$$ , the minimum cost frontier is defined as
c!y, x " ! min #w " x : D!y, x " " 1 $. The optimal input vector x $ minimizes the costs of producing y given the
x

input prices w. Cost efficiency then is simply defined as:
" $
CE!y, x " ! w x" .
wx

Cost efficiency captures pure technical efficiency, scale efficiency, and allocative efficiency. Allocative
efficiency measures the ability of a DMU to use inputs in optimal proportions, given their relative
prices. Given a measure of total technical efficiency and cost efficiency, allocative efficiency is
determined residually as
AE!y, x " !

CE!y, x"
.
TE!y, x"

Therefore, we have the following decomposition of cost efficiency: CE!y, x" ! AE!y, x" % PTE!y, x" %
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SE!y, x".
Finally, by specifying the additional economic objective of maximizing revenues, we can estimate the
revenue efficiency of each DMU. Assuming output prices p ! !p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p M " " ! # M
$$ , the objective is revenue
maximization, subject to the constraints imposed by input supplies and the production technology. The revenue
maximization problem is: r!y, x " ! max #p " y : D!y, x " " 1 $. Given the optimal outputs y $ , revenue efficiency
y

is given by the ratio of actual revenue to maximum revenue: RE!y, x " !

p"y
.
p"y$

Data Envelopment Analysis
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a non-parametric mathematical programming approach to
estimating distance functions. Assuming the availability of input, output, and price data for each of N DMUs,
DEA can be used to construct a frontier such that all observed points lie on or below the frontier. For the ith
DMU, let vectors x i , y i , and w i represent the K, M, and K length column vectors of inputs, outputs, and input
prices. Define the matrices X, Y, W as the K % N, M % N, and K % N matrices of inputs, outputs, and input prices
for all DMUs, i ! 1, 2, . . . , N.
To measure technical efficiency with a CRS production frontier, the following linear program is solved
for each DMU.

min ! i
! i ," i

subject to : y i # Y" i
! i x i " X" i
"i " 0
where " i is an N % 1 intensity vector for firm i representing the combination of DMUs that form the
production frontier for firm i. The solution ! $i is a scalar representing the equi-proportional reduction in
inputs for firm i that would enable it to produce output vector y i if it operated on the production
frontier. A value of ! $i ! 1, thus would imply that the firm is operating on the frontier, i.e., no
reduction in inputs is possible for firm i. This program is solved for each firm in the sample, resulting
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in a technical efficiency score for each firm TE i ! ! $i , i ! 1, 2, . . ., N. Constraining the " i only to be
non-negative results in a constant returns to scale (CRS) frontier.
Following Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984), the above program is modified to account for variable
returns to scale (VRS) by adding the convexity constraint # "N " i ! 1, where # "N is an N-element vector of 1s.
Solving the linear programming problem with this constraint yields a convex hull that envelops the data more
tightly, resulting in an estimate of pure technical efficiency (PTE). Denoting the solution to the modified program
$$
by ! $$
i , the estimate of pure technical efficiency is given by PTE i ! TE VRS !y, x " ! ! i . Scale efficiency is given

by the ratio of the two solutions, SE i !

! $i
. To determine whether firm i is operating with increasing or
! $$
i

decreasing returns to scale, it is necessary to conduct the estimation again with the constraint # "N " i # 1, giving a
non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS) frontier and NIRS estimates of technical efficiency, TE NIRS !y, x ". If
SE i ! 1, the firm has achieved CRS. If SE i % 1 and TE VRS !y, x " ! TE NIRS !y, x ", then DRS is indicated; and if
SE i % 1 and TE VRS !y, x " % TE NIRS !y, x ", IRS is indicated.
To estimate cost efficiency, the objective function of the program is altered to capture total firm costs.
The linear program is specified as

min w"i x i
" i ,x i

subject to :

y i # Y" i
x i " X" i
" i " 0.

Letting x $i be the cost minimizing vector of inputs for firm i, cost efficiency is given by CE i !

w"i x $i
.
w"i x i

Given estimates of cost and technical efficiency, allocative efficiency is estimated by the ratio
AE i ! CE i . The solution of the cost efficiency program provides the cost-minimizing input vector
TE i
conditional on the observed technology in the sample. If the ratio x ik$ & 1, the firm is under-utilizing
x ik
input k; and if x ik$ ' 1, the firm is overutilizing input k.
x ik
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Revenue efficiency is computed with a similar linear program, where the objective is changed from cost
minimization to revenue maximization

max p "i y i
" i ,y i

subject to : to

y i # Y" i
x i " X" i
" i " 0.

Letting

y $i

be the cost minimizing vector of inputs for firm i, revenue efficiency is given by RE i !

p "i y i
.
"
p i y $i

Ex-Post Analysis
After estimating efficiency scores and optimal inputs, we estimate regression models with the ratio of
actual-to-optimal capital, revenue efficiency, and return on equity as dependent variables. The primary objective
of the actual-to-optimal capital equation is to test the hypotheses about capital structure in the industry that were
specified in section 3 above. The primary objective of the revenue efficiency and return on equity equations is to
provide information on whether measured capital under or over-utilization is value-creating or value-destroying
in the insurance industry. Ordinary least squares (OLS) is used to estimate the revenue efficiency equation and a
version of the revenue efficiency and ROE regressions including the variables discussed in section 3.
We also estimate a version of the actual-to-optimal capital regression that includes an indicator variable
set equal to 1 if the firms has an A rating or better from the A.M. Best Company, and to zero otherwise. This is
based on the hypothesis that a firm’s financial rating may help to explain its capital utilization, e.g., firms may
add capital in order to be assured of retaining the requisite A rating from Best’s. Because the rating variable is
jointly determined with the firms actual-to-optimal capital ratio, OLS estimation of the version of the model that
included the Best’s variable would yield inconsistent parameter estimates. To correct for this endogeneity
problem the equation which includes the Best’s indicator variable is estimated using two alternative
methodologies – the inverse Mill’s ratio approach and instrumental variables estimation.
The inverse Mill’s ratio (IM) approach involves adding two inverse Mill’s ratios to the equation as
additional regressors and then estimating the resulting augmented equation by ordinary least squares. The
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inverse Mill’s ratios correct for the possibility that the expected value of the error term, conditional on the firm
having an A rating or better, is likely to be different from the expected value of the regression error term,
conditional on the firm being rated below A. The inverse Mill’s terms are in fact functions of the conditional
means of the error term for firms having Best’s indicator function values of 0 and 1, respectively. The ratios are
estimated using a probit equation with the Best’s rating indicator variable as the dependent variable.
The second approach to correcting for the potential endogeneity of the Best’s rating variable is
instrumental variables (IV) estimation. The approach is similar to conventional two-stage least squares except
that the instrumental variable for the Best’s rating is equal to the predicted value of each firm’s probability of
having an A rating or above based on a reduced-form probit model with the Best’s indicator variable as the
dependent variable. Further discussion of the IM and IV estimation techniques are provided in the Appendix.
In the ROE equation we include both the Best’s indicator variable and the firm’s revenue efficiency
score as addtional explanatory variables. The inclusion of the Best’s variable is based on the hypothesis that
firms with A ratings or above are likely to earn economic rents because of the perception among buyers that such
firms have relatively low insolvency risk. The revenue efficiency variable is included based on the rationale that
revenue efficient firms are likely to have higher returns, because they waste less of their potential revenues due
to inefficiency than do inefficient firms. Both variables are expected to be jointly determined with the dependent
varaible and thus are treated as endogenous. Because we have both a dichotomous and a continuous endogenous
variable in this equation, we control for endogeneity using the IV approach.

6. The Sample, Outputs, and Inputs
The Sample
The primary source of data for the study consists of regulatory annual statements filed by insurers with
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) over the period 1993 to 1998. The decision
making units (DMUs) in the insurance industry consist of groups of affiliated insurers under common ownership
and unaffiliated single insurers. The sample consists of all groups and unaffiliated insurers for which meaningful
data were available. 7 The number of DMUs declined from 972 in 1993 to 778 in 1998, primarily due to
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consolidation in the insurance industry. To apply DEA, it is necessary to specify inputs, outputs, and prices. The
following sections define these variables.
Output Quantities and Prices
Consistent with the recent financial institutions literature, the value-added approach is used to define
property-liability insurer outputs (Berger and Humphrey 1992). The value-added approach counts as important
outputs those with significant value added, as judged using operating cost allocations. Consistent with the recent
literature on insurance efficiency (see Cummins and Weiss 2000), the principal outputs we consider are risk
pooling/risk bearing, real services, and financial intermediation, briefly defined as follows:
& Risk-pooling and risk-bearing: Insurance provides a mechanism through which consumers and
businesses exposed to losses can engage in risk diversification through pooling. For consumers, insurance
diversification provides value by reducing the uncertainty in their final level of wealth. For business firms,
insurance adds value by reducing income volatility, thereby reducing expected tax payments, expected costs of
financial distress, and the costs of external finance. The actuarial, underwriting, and related expenses incurred in
risk pooling are important components of value added in the industry. Insurers also add value by holding equity
capital to bear the residual risk of the pool.
& ”Real” financial services relating to insured losses: Insurers provide a variety of real services for
policyholders, including the design of risk management programs and the provision of legal defense in liability
disputes. By contracting with insurers to provide these services, policyholders can take advantage of insurers’
expertise to reduce the costs of managing risk.
& Financial intermediation: For property-liability insurers, intermediation is an important but
somewhat incidental function, resulting from the collection of premiums in advance of claim payments to
minimize contract enforcement costs. Insurers’ value added from intermediation is reflected in the net interest
margin between the rate of return earned on invested assets and the rate credited to policyholders.
Transactions flow data such as the number of applications processed, the number of policies issued, the
number of claims settled, etc. are not publicly available for insurers. However, a satisfactory proxy for the
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quantity of risk-pooling and real insurance services output is the present value of real losses incurred (Berger,
Cummins, and Weiss 1997, Cummins, Weiss, and Zi 1999, Cummins and Weiss 2000). Losses incurred are
defined as the losses that are expected to be paid as the result of providing insurance coverage during a
particular period of time. Because the objective of risk-pooling is to collect funds from the policyholder pool and
redistribute them to those who incur losses, proxying output by the amount of losses incurred seems quite
appropriate. Losses are also a good proxy for the amount of real services provided, since the amount of claims
settlement and risk management services also are highly correlated with loss aggregates.
Because the types of services provided differ between the principal types of insurance and the timing of
the loss cash flows also varies, we use as separate output measures the present values of personal lines short-tail
losses, personal lines long-tail losses, commercial lines short-tail losses, and commercial lines long-tail losses,
where the tail length refers to the length of the loss cash flow stream. 8 Cash flow patterns are estimated from
data in Schedule P of the NAIC insurance regulatory statement using the Taylor separation method (see
Cummins 1990), and discounting is conducted using U.S. Treasury yield curves obtained from the Federal
Reserve Economic Database (FRED) maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Average real invested assets for each year are used to measure the quantity of the intermediation output.
All monetary valued variables are deflated to real 1989 values based on the consumer price index (CPI).
In keeping with the value-added approach to output measurement, the prices of the insurance outputs are
P & PV!L i "
, where p i ! price of insurance output i, i ! 1, . . ., 4 for personal
defined as follows: p i ! i
PV!L i "
short-tail output, personal long-tail output, commercial short-tail output, and commercial long-tail output. This
is a generalization of the insurance unit price concept that has been used extensively in the insurance economics
literature (e.g., Pauly, Kleindorfer, and Kunreuther 1989). The conventional unit price measures the cost of
delivering $1 of benefits as the ratio of premiums to incurred losses. However, because premiums reflect
implicit discounting to account for the insurer’s use of policyholder funds between the premium payment and loss
payment dates, it would be incorrect to compare premiums to the nominal (undiscounted) value of losses. By
using the present value of losses to represent the quantity of insurance, consistency is maintained in recognizing
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the time value of money both in the premium and loss components of the price.
For the price of the intermediation output, we need a measure of the expected rate of return on the
insurer’s assets.

Although insurers are primarily fixed income investors, equities represent a significant

proportion of invested assets for property-liability insurers (approximately 25 percent of invested assets in
1999). Accordingly, the expected return on assets should incorporate the expected returns on both the debt and
equity components of insurer investment portfolios. Because the expected return on bonds and notes generally
will be close to the actual return, we use the ratio of actual investment income (minus dividends on stocks) to
insurer holdings of debt instruments to represent the rate of return on that component of the portfolio. For stocks,
we compute the expected return for a specified year as the 90-day Treasury bill rate at the end of the preceding
year plus the long-term (1926 to the end of the preceding year) average market risk premium on large company
stocks from Ibbotson Associates (1999). Using this approach assumes that insurers have equity portfolios with a
market beta coefficient of 1.0.
The expected portfolio rate of return for each insurer is determined as a weighted average of the debt
and equity returns with weights equal to the proportion of the total portfolio invested in debt securities and
stocks. Thus, the price of the intermediation function differs across insurers because of variation both in the
return on debt instruments and in the debt/equity portfolio proportions.
Input Quantities and Prices
Insurance inputs are classified into three groups: labor, materials and business services, and financial
capital. Because insurers do not report the number of employees or hours worked, the quantity of labor must be
imputed by dividing the total expenditure on labor by the price of labor. Denoting the quantity of labor by Q L ,
the current dollar expenditures as X cL , and the current dollar wage rate as w cL , the quantity of labor is determined
as Q L !

X cL
w cL
!
.
The
real
price
of
labor
is
found
by
deflating
the
current
dollar
wage
rate,
w
L
c , where c is
w cL

the consumer price index (CPI). Multiplying the quantity of labor by the real price of labor thus yields constant
dollar labor expenditures.
Current dollar expenditures for labor equal the sum of expenditures for administrative labor and agent
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labor. Administrative labor expenditures are obtained from insurers’ annual statements as the sum of salaries,
payroll taxes, and employee relations and welfare expenditures. For agent labor, current dollar expenditures are
obtained from the annual statements as the sum of net commissions and brokerage fees plus allowances to
agents. The price of the labor input is a weighted average of the prices of administrative labor and agent labor,
with weights equal to expenditures on each category of labor divided by total labor expenditures. The price of
administrative labor is the U.S. Department of Labor average weekly wage rate for property and liability
insurers (SIC 6331) in the state of the insurer’s home office. The price of agent labor is the premium-weighted
average of Labor Department’s insurance agents’ weekly wage rates (SIC 6411) in states where the insurer
operates, with weights equal to the proportion of the insurer’s direct premiums written in each state.
The quantity of materials and business services inputs is also imputed from total expenditures and
prices. Current dollar expenditures on materials and business services is obtained from the annual statement as
total expenses incurred less all labor costs. This captures expenditures on advertising, board and bureau fees,
equipment, printing, communications, auditing, and other business expenses. 9 The price of materials and
business services input is given by a national average price index for business services from the U.S. Department
of Commerce.
Financial capital is included as an insurer input since it is an essential component of the technology that
produces the insurance product. Besides satisfying regulatory requirements, equity capital affects the quality of
the insurance product by reducing the probability of default. Viewing insurance as risky debt, insurance prices
reflect the expected costs associated with insurer default, so capital levels ultimately affect the revenue and profit
of an insurer. Including capital is especially important in the current study, because our objective is to determine
whether insurers are allocatively inefficient because of the overuse of equity capital.
The quantity of equity capital for an insurance company is defined as its statutory policyholder surplus
augmented by reserves required by statutory (regulatory) accounting but not recognized by generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP). The primary reserves in this category are the ”provision for reinsurance” and the
”excess of statutory over statement reserves.” The average of beginning and end-of-year equity capital is used
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as the insurer’s capital for any given year. These values are deflated to current dollars using the CPI.
Because the majority of insurers are not publicly traded, market equity returns are not observed for most
firms in the sample. We adopt two alternative approaches to measuring the cost of equity capital: (1) The cost
of equity is assumed to be constant for all firms in the industry and equal to the 90 day Treasury bill rate at the
end of the preceding year plus the long-term (1926 to the end of the preceding year) market risk premium on
large firm stocks as reported in Ibbotson Associates (1999). (2) Following Cummins, Tennyson, and Weiss
(1998), we alternatively adopt a three-tier approach to measuring the cost of capital, based on financial ratings
assigned by the A.M. Best Company. Best’s uses a fifteen tier letter-coded rating system ranging from A$$ for
the strongest insurers to F for insurers in liquidation. The three tiers we adopt consist of the four ratings in the
“A” range, the four ratings in the “B” range, and all other rating categories. Based on an examination of the
equity cost of capital for traded insurers, we assign a cost of capital of 12 percent to the top tier, 15 percent for
the middle tier, and 18 percent for insurers in the lowest quality-tier. We rely primarily on the first measure of
the cost of equity in reporting the results and briefly discuss the second measure as a robustness check. As a
further adjustment for the variation in the cost of capital across insurers, we include variables known to be
related to the cost of capital such as ROE volatility in our regression analysis.
Inputs and Outputs: Summary
To summarize, we use five outputs and three inputs. The outputs are the present value of real losses
incurred for personal short-tail, personal long-tail, commercial short-tail, and commercial long-tail coverages as
well as total assets, representing the intermediation output. The prices of the four insurance outputs are the
difference between premiums and the loss present values, a measure of value-added, divided by the present value
of losses. The price of the intermediation output is the expected rate of return on the insurer’s investment
portfolio. The inputs consist of labor, materials and business services, and equity capital.

7. Results
This section presents the results of our empirical analysis of insurer capitalization. We first present
summary statistics on the principal variables included in our analysis, with an emphasis on changes in input
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usage over the sample period. We then turn to a discussion of the efficiency results, including comparisons of
actual and optimal input usage. The section concludes by presenting the regression results used to test our
hypotheses and provide information on whether measured sub-optimal input usage represents a true inefficiency
or a rational response to market forces.
Summary Statistics
The inputs, input prices, and expenses of the property-liability insurance industry for the period
1993-1998 are shown in Table 3. Input utilization and expenditures increased over the sample period for all
inputs. However, in percentage terms, the use of labor and materials declined over the sample period, whereas
the percentage of total expenses attributable to financial capital increased (see the lowest panel in Table 3). The
financial capital percentages are computed in two ways – using the yearly input prices and using the average
input price for the sample period. The latter calculation was conducted in order to isolate the effect of the
increase in the quantity of capital consumed from the change in price over the period. When the yearly prices of
capital are used, capital increased from 20.4 percent of total expenses in 1993 to 32.3 percent in 1998. When
the average price of capital is used, capital increased from 23.1 percent of expenses in 1993 to 31.1 percent in
1998. Thus, usage of the capital input increased significantly in both absolute and relative terms during the
sample period.
Outputs and revenues are shown in Table 4. The quantity of insurance output is roughly evenly divided
between the personal and commercial lines. However, the commercial lines have higher prices because these
lines are more risky and have higher service intensity than personal lines. Consequently, the majority of
insurance revenues are attributable to the commercial lines. The intermediation output also accounts for a
significant proportion of total revenues. The last section of the table shows that the percentage of total revenues
attributable to the intermediation function has increased from 33 percent in 1993 to 39 percent in 1998,
primarily due to favorable investment returns. When the average intermediation price is used rather than the
year-by-year prices, the increase in revenues from the intermediation output is not as steep.
Additional summary statistics are presented in Table 5, which shows yearly values and averages of
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variables used in our regression models. Notably, the sub-optimal capital-to-asset ratio (actual minus optimal
capital over assets) increased from 13.3 to 15.4 percent over the sample period. Otherwise, there are few
pronounced trends in the variables, except for an increase in the ratio of stocks and real estate to total assets
from 18.1 percent in 1993 to 21.5 percent in 1998. The proportion of mutuals increased during the sample
period, primarily because stock insurers are more likely to be involved in mergers and acquisitions.
Efficiency Results
The results of the DEA analysis are presented in Table 6. Average scores are shown for pure technical,
scale, technical, allocative, cost, and revenue efficiency. 10 The average efficiency scores are comparable to the
scores reported in earlier research on property-liability insurers (Cummins and Weiss 1993, Cummins, Weiss,
and Zi 1999). Cost efficiency in the industry tends to be around 40 percent, with pure technical inefficiency
being the primary drag on cost efficiency – pure technical efficiency averages around 62 percent, whereas scale
and allocative efficiency average 90 and 73 percent, respectively. The finding with respect to pure technical
inefficiency is perhaps not surprising given the rapid pace of technological change in the past few years.
Revenue efficiency averages about 30 percent, indicating a fairly high degree of revenue inefficiency in the
industry, at least on average.
The sources of allocative inefficiency in our sample of insurers are further analyzed in Table 7. Part A
of

the

table

shows

percentage

departure

from

optimal

utilization

ratios

defined

as

follows:

U i ! 100 $ ! Xopti & 1", where U i ! under or over-utilization of input i, X i ! actual quantity of input i, and X opt
i
Xi
! optimal quantity of input i. If U i ' 0, the implication is that inputs are over-utilized and if U i & 0, inputs are
under-utilized.

Table 7 reveals that insurers on average over-utilize all three inputs.

The average

over-utilization of labor is 159.7 percent, indicating that insurers could reduce labor input by about 60 percent if
they operated as efficiently as the best practice firms in the industry. The over-utilization of materials and
business services is substantially less than for labor, only 57.2 percent, implying that insurers could reduce
materials inputs by 36 percent if they operated with full efficiency.
The over-utilization of capital is 85 percent on average. The years with the two largest over-utilization
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estimates are in the second half of the sample period, providing some evidence that overcapitalization has
increased over time. On average, insurers could reduce capital by about 46 percent if they were fully efficient.
Interestingly, if capital is reduced by 46 percent in 1999, the industry’s leverage ratios are more aligned with
historical averages – 1.6 for the premiums to surplus ratio and .20 for the capital-to-asset ratio (based on the
data underlying Figure 1). This again provides some support for the hypothesis that insurers hoard capital to
avoid having to raise external capital following a loss or investment shock. The amount of capital
over-utilization in billions of dollars is shown in section B of the Table 7. Over-utilization increased by nearly
90 percent over the sample period, from 66.6 billion in 1993 to 124.2 billion in 1998.
Regression Analysis
The regression analysis consists of three equations with dependent variables equal to the ratio of the
insurer’s actual capital to optimal capital, revenue efficiency, and return on equity (ROE), respectively. The
actual-to-optimal capital equation is designed to identify covariates related to the utilization of capital, based on
the theoretical discussion presented above. The implication of the capital over-utilization equation is either: (1)
The more intensive use of capital by some firms represents a legitimate response to market conditions, so that the
measured ”over-utilization” is not really an inefficiency but is actually valued by the market. Or (2) the
independent variables help to explain patterns of capital utilization in the industry, but measured capital
over-utilization primarily constitutes inefficiency rather than legitimate optimization behavior. The revenue
efficiency regression provides information on which of these interpretations is correct by including both the
firm’s optimal capital-to-asset ratio and the ratio of capital under or over-utilization to assets (the sub-optimal
capital-to-asset ratio) among the independent variables.

If over-utilization represents an inefficiency, the

sub-optimal capital-to-asset ratio will have a negative coefficient; and if the measured over-utilization is valued
by the market, the over-utilization variable will have a positive coefficient.
The actual-to-optimal capital regression equations are presented in Table 8. Three equations are shown
in the table. The first equation, which is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS), omits the Best’s rating
indicator variable. As mentioned above, the Best’s rating variable is set equal to 1 if the firm has an A rating or
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better from the A.M. Best Company, and to zero otherwise. The variables is omitted from the OLS equation
because it is jointly determined with capital and hence would likely result in biased coefficient estimates under
OLS. The two additional equations in Table 8, which include the Best’s rating indicator variable, are estimated
using methodologies designed to control for the endogeneity of the Best’s rating variable. Specifically, one
equation uses the inverse Mill’s (IM) approach and the other uses the instrumental variables (IV) approach.
The regressions presented in Table 8 provide support for most of our hypotheses regarding differences
in capital utilization among insurers. The Best’s A rating indicator variable is positive and significant in the IM
and IV regressions, as expected if firms hold more capital in order to reduce the probability of a ratings
downgrade. The reinsurance variable has a negative coefficient, as expected if use of reinsurance is a substitute
for holding capital in terms of minimizing the expected costs of financial distress. However, this variable is
statistically significant only in the OLS model. The ratio of stocks and real estate to total assets in positive and
significant in all three equations, as expected if insurers hold additional capital to compensate for higher risk in
the asset portfolio. The natural log of assets is negative and significant, consistent with the argument that risk is
inversely related to the size of the risk pool. The square of the size variable has a positive coefficient,
suggesting diminishing returns in the effect of size on capital requirements. The mutual dummy variable is
negative and significant, providing support for the view that the cost of capital is higher for mutuals because of
unresolved agency conflicts.
The standard deviation of book return on equity is negative and significant in the OLS equation but is
positive and significant in the IM and IV regressions. We consider the latter two equations to be more reliable
because they include the Best’s rating variable and thus are less likely than the OLS equation to suffer from
omitted variable bias. Thus, we believe that the results support the hypothesis that firms with more volatile
income streams utilize more capital.
The one-year premium growth rate is positive as expected but is significant only in the IM regression,
providing weak evidence that firms with growth opportunities hold more internal capital to take advantage of
positive net present value projects. The ratio of personal insurance output to total insurance output is negative
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and significant, consistent with the argument that commercial buyers are more sensitive to insolvency risk than
personal buyers. The ratio of insurance reserves to losses incurred is negative and significant, as predicted if
firms with more long-tail business are more levered in order to discourage managers from taking actions that are
contrary to the interests of policyholders.
The line of business Herfindahl index is positive and significant in the inverse Mill’s and instrumental
variables regressions, as expected if less diversified firms need more capital. This variable is negative and
significant in the OLS regression. Because we consider the IM and IV regressions more reliable than the OLS
regression, we believe that the evidence with regard to this variable supports the diversification hypothesis.
Contrary to expectations, the geographical Herfindahl index is negative and significant in all three equations. A
possible explanation for these results is that operating over wider geographical areas exposes insurers to more
risk because of the difficulties in controlling and monitoring the underwriting process in more complex
organizations, possibly offsetting the diversification benefits associated with lower Herfindahl indices. Finally,
an F test reveals that there are no significant differences among the intercept terms for the six years of the
sample period. This either suggests that risk-based capital had no significant effects on overall capitalization in
the industry or that any capital adjustments predated our sample period.
The revenue efficiency and return on equity equations presented in Table 9 are primarily designed to
provide information on whether measured ”sub-optimal” capital utilization represents a legitimate arket
conditions or a true inefficiency which degrades firm performance.
The revenue efficiency equation provides evidence consistent with the view that firms are rewarded for
achieving the optimal capital-to-asset ratio but that sub-optimal capital utilization represents a true inefficiency.
The optimal capital-to-asset ratio has a significant positive coefficient indicating that firms are rewarded with
additional revenues for holding the optimal amount of capital, consistent with the argument that insurers hold
capital to satisfy market demands for safe insurance. However, the firm’s sub-optimal capital-to-asset ratio has
a negative coefficient in the revenue efficiency equation. This provides strong evidence that firm’s holding more
or less capital than the measured optimum are penalized by the insurance market in the form of lower revenues
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either because they hold too little capital and thus have higher insolvency risk than buyers find desirable or
because they hold too much capital and perhaps try to cover the dead-weight costs of the excess capital by
charging prices that drive away customers.
The results with the other explanatory variables in the revenue efficiency equation are mostly consistent
with expectations. Both the geographical and line of business Herfindahl indices are positive and significant,
suggesting that more diversified firms are rewarded with higher revenues. The size variable also is positive and
significant, perhaps suggesting that larger firms have lower insolvency risk or that size conveys advantages in
terms of market power. The stock and real estate variable is negative and significant, suggesting that firms with
riskier assets are less revenue efficient. However, the more global risk measure, the coefficient of variation of
ROE, is positive and significant, consistent with the general capital-markets argument that firms taking more
risk are rewarded with higher returns, other things equal. Mutuals are less revenue efficient than stocks,
supporting the argument that mutuals have higher default risk. This result could also be consistent with the
expense preference hypothesis, i.e., that mutuals are less efficient than stocks because of unresolved agency
conflicts. The ratio of personal insurance output to total insurance output is negative and significant and the
ratio of insurance reserves to losses incurred is positive and significant, reflecting higher prices received by
commercial lines and long-tail lines (see Table 4). 11
The return on equity (ROE) equations also are shown in Table 9. The dependent variable in the
regressions is ROE before policyholder dividends and taxes because this variable focuses directly on the firm’s
market outcome in terms of net income, prior to deduction of the discretionary item, policyholder dividends, and
government mandated tax payments. 12 Two versions of the regression are included in Table 9, an OLS version
that omits the Best’s A rating indicator variable and revenue efficiency and an instrumental variables version
that includes these potentially endogenous variables.
The ROE regressions provide additional evidence that measured sub-optimal capital utilization is a true
inefficiency. The optimal capital-to-asset ratio has a significant negative coefficient in the ROE regressions,
consistent with the financial theory prediction that better capitalized firms have lower costs of capital. The
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sub-optimal capital-to-asset ratio also has a significant negative coefficient in the regressions. However, the
coefficient of this variable is substantially smaller in absolute value than the coefficient of the optimal
capital-to-asset ratio. This result is consistent with the view that holding capital in excess of the optimal amount
also reduces the firm’s cost of capital but by a significantly smaller marginal amount due to a penalty for
inefficiency. Both the Best’s indicator variable and revenue efficiency have significant positive coefficients,
providing evidence that efficient firms with good financial ratings earn higher returns.
The signs of the other variables in the ROE models are generally consistent with our theoretical
predictions. The geographical and line of business Herfindahl indices have significant positive coefficients
consistent with the argument that the cost of capital is inversely related to diversification. The ratio of stocks and
real estate to total assets and the standard deviation of return on equity also have significant positive coefficients,
consistent with the hypothesized positive relationship between risk and the cost of capital. Likewise, the
reinsurance utilization variable has a significant negative coefficient, consistent with the argument that
reinsurance reduces default risk. The ratio of personal lines output to total insurance output has a significant
positive coefficient, supporting the argument that commercial lines insurers have lower default risk than personal
lines firms. The premium growth rate has a negative coefficient, but is significant only in the OLS equation,
providing weak evidence that firms with growth opportunities have lower costs of capital.
The size variable in the ROE equations has a significant positive sign, consistent with the argument that
larger firms earn higher profits, other things equal, perhaps due to market power. The long tail lines variable
(loss reserves divided by losses incurred) has is significant and negative consistent with the view that premiums
in the long-tail lines have a higher discount for the time value of money than premiums in the short-tail lines.
Finally, the mutual dummy variable is negative, but significant only in the IV regression, providing some support
for the hypothesis that mutual firms write lower risk business than stock firms.
The overall conclusions to be drawn from the regression analysis are the following: (1) Measured
sub-optimal capital utilization primarily reflects inefficiency, for which insurers incur a penalty in terms of
revenues. In addition, holding capital in excess of the optimal amount reduces the cost of capital but by a much
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smaller marginal amount than holding optimal capital. (2) Revenue efficient firms and firms with A or better
financial ratings earn higher returns than inefficient firms and firms with lower financial ratings. (3) Nearly all
of the hypotheses about the relationships between firm characteristics and capital over-utilization are supported
by the actual-to-optimal capital equation.

8. Conclusions
This paper investigates the use of equity capital in the property-liability insurance industry. The
investigation is motivated by the sharp decline in industry leverage over the past fifteen years. Our objective is
to determine whether the change in relative capitalization represents an over-utilization of capital in the industry
or a rational response to changing market conditions.
The primary source of capital growth in the industry over the past ten years is realized and unrealized
capital gains, which jointly account for more than 50 percent of the capital increase. Prior theoretical and
empirical evidence suggests that insurers are reluctant to pay dividends when capital increases because it is
difficult and costly for these firms to raise external capital following a loss or investment shock. Thus, insurers
may tend to ”hoard” capital during profitable times as a hedge against the next underwriting or investment crisis.
Our analysis of insurer stockholder dividend payout rates supports this argument – payout rates were actually
less in 1994-1998 than in 1989-1994, even though capital increased twice as fast in the latter period.
To further investigate the capital over-utilization issue, we estimate technical, allocative, cost, and
revenue efficiency in the industry using a non-parametric technique, data envelopment analysis (DEA), for the
period 1993-1998. DEA measures the efficiency of each firm in our sample relative to ”best practice” efficient
frontiers formed by the fully efficient firms in the industry. Fully efficient firms are measured as having
efficiency scores equal to 1, while inefficient firms have scores between 0 and 1.
The efficiency scores in our analysis are consistent with prior research on the property-liability
insurance industry. Cost efficiency averages about 40 percent, implying that insurers could reduce costs by
about 60 percent if they could operate with full efficiency. Average technical efficiency in our sample is 55
percent and average allocative efficiency is 73 percent.
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These results suggest that failure to adopt

state-of-the-art technology is the primary source of cost inefficiency in the industry. However, allocative
inefficiency, defined as the failure to choose the optimal combination of inputs, is also a driver of cost
inefficiency. Revenue efficiency in the industry averages only 30 percent during our sample period, indicative of
a significant loss of potential revenues..
The efficiency analysis enables us to estimate the optimal utilization of inputs for each firm in the
sample, i.e., the optimal quantities of labor, materials and business services, and equity capital, conditional on
the firm’s output vector and input prices. By comparing a firm’s actual capital utilization with its optimal
capital, we are able to provide direct evidence on the capital utilization issue.
The results indicate that firms on average over-utilize all three inputs, with the labor input subject to the
most severe over-utilization. Based on a weighted average across the industry, insurers could reduce labor by 62
percent, materials by 36 percent, and capital by 46 percent if they were fully efficient. The results thus provide
strong support for the argument that insurers over-utilize equity capital. When the ratios of premiums to capital
and capital-to-assets are computed using optimal industry capital rather than actual capital, the ratios are much
closer to their historical averages than to the actual industry ratios for 1999 – the recalculated premiums to
surplus ratio is 1.6, compared to an actual ratio of 1.0, and the recalculated capital-to-asset ratio is 0.2,
compared to an actual ratio of 0.36. This provides further evidence of capital ”stickiness” in the industry, i.e., a
reluctance by insurers to distribute equity capital accumulations as dividends.
The final part of our analysis involves estimating regression equations. Three dependent variables are
investigated – the ratio of actual capital to optimal capital, revenue efficiency, and return on equity. The
explanatory variables in the models are designed to proxy for several economic hypotheses regarding insurer
motivations for holding capital.

The actual-to-optimal capital regression supports most of our economic

hypotheses, and a substantial part (about 80 percent) of the variability of the dependent variable can be
explained by our models. We find evidence supporting the hypothesis that insurers hold equity capital to reduce
the expected costs of financial distress, to take advantage of growth opportunities without raising external
capital, to deal with various informational asymmetries and agency costs, and to achieve higher financial ratings.

38

There are two opposing interpretations that can be given to the actual-to-optimal capital regression: (1)
Because firms hold capital in response to hypothesized organizational and market characteristics, the measured
”over-utilization” could represent a rational response to market conditions that is rewarded with higher revenues;
or (2) the measured over-utilization is a true inefficiency, degrading the performance of inefficient firms. The
revenue efficiency and return on equity regressions are designed to help distinguish between these two
possibilities.
The results support the second interpretation of measured capital over-utilization. The optimal
capital-to-asset ratio is positively related to revenue efficiency, suggesting that optimally capitalized firms are
rewarded with higher revenues. However, the sub-optimal capital-to-assets ratio (the ratio of actual capital
minus optimal capital to assets) is inversely related to revenue efficiency, suggesting that measured capital
over-utilization primarily reflects inefficiency. The optimal capital-to- assets ratio is inversely related to return
on equity, consistent with the argument that better capitalized firms have lower costs of capital. The sub-optimal
capital-to-asset ratio also has a negative coefficient, but it is much smaller in absolute value than the coefficient
of the optimal capital-to-asset ratio. This provides evidence that the safety benefits of holding capital in excess
of the optimum are at least partially offset by a market penalty for inefficiency.
Overall, we conclude that the run-up in equity capital of the past decade is primarily attributable to
capital gains on investments. Further, we provide evidence that capital levels in the industry are ”sticky” in the
sense that insurers are reluctant to pay out capital accumulations as dividends, preferring to maintain internal
funds to cushion the next loss or investment shock. Finally, we find that insurers are substantially over-utilizing
equity capital and that the over-utilization primarily represents an inefficiency that leads to financial
performance penalties that are directly related to the degree of over-utilization.
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Figure 1: Leverage Ratios 1970-1999
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Figure 2: Growth Rates Of Premiums and Equity - 6 Year
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Table 1
Sources of Equity Capital Growth
Retained
Earnings
Realized
Unrealized
(non-CG) Capital Gains Capital Gains
7.57
4.65
8.03
7.95
2.88
-5.12
9.37
4.81
13.43
-4.05
9.89
-0.06
9.50
9.82
1.05
9.21
1.66
-1.81
14.60
6.00
21.72
15.16
9.24
13.31
26.01
10.81
28.98
12.75
18.02
10.24

Section A:
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

Total Change
in Surplus
16.04
3.49
20.12
4.21
19.25
8.12
37.54
30.60
52.87
23.51

1989-1998
1989-1994
1994-1998

215.74
63.10
152.64

108.07
30.34
77.73

77.78
32.05
45.73

Capital
Stockholder
Paid-In
Dividends
2.39
-5.52
3.43
-5.66
2.00
-5.76
5.51
-6.49
7.43
-7.26
6.82
-6.29
7.11
-8.23
4.50
-8.96
3.91
-11.31
5.19
-13.31

89.76
17.33
72.43

48.30
20.76
27.53

Section B:
1989-1998
1989-1994
1994-1998

Total
Funds
323.90
100.48
223.43

Retained
Earnings
33.4%
30.2%
34.8%

- Percent by Source Realized
Unrealized
Gains
Gains
24.0%
27.7%
31.9%
17.2%
20.5%
32.4%

Capital
Paid-In
14.9%
20.7%
12.3%

Section C:
1989-1998
1989-1994
1994-1998

Total
Stockholder
Funds
Dividends
323.90
24.3%
100.48
30.5%
223.43
21.5%

- Percent by Use Misc.
Retained
Uses
Earnings
9.1%
66.6%
6.7%
62.8%
10.2%
68.3%

Total
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

-78.80
-30.69
-48.10

Misc
Surplus
Changes
-1.08
0.00
-3.73
-0.59
-1.29
-1.47
-3.65
-2.64
-5.53
-9.38

Percent
Paid as
Dividends
24.4%
61.9%
19.5%
57.5%
26.1%
39.6%
16.7%
21.2%
16.2%
28.8%

-29.37
-6.69
-22.68

24.3%
30.5%
21.5%

Table 2
Yearly Returns and Volatilities:
Insurance Stocks and S&P 500 Index

Year
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Averages:
1985-1999
1986-1999
1990-1999
1995-1999

Actual Yearly Return
Insurance
S&P

Implied Yearly StdDev
Insurance
S&P

62.4%
12.7%
-5.3%
27.1%
38.7%
-12.8%
50.2%
42.6%
32.4%
1.3%
49.4%
22.2%
39.0%
1.1%
-15.5%

26.3%
14.6%
2.0%
12.4%
27.2%
-6.6%
26.3%
4.5%
7.1%
-1.5%
34.1%
20.3%
31.0%
26.7%
19.5%

13.7%
18.3%
23.4%
7.9%
7.6%
14.4%
12.0%
9.3%
10.5%
8.0%
6.5%
7.3%
9.2%
15.4%
12.1%

10.0%
16.4%
24.0%
15.2%
13.5%
15.9%
13.5%
8.9%
7.7%
10.0%
6.9%
12.9%
15.5%
18.6%
18.7%

23.0%
20.2%
21.0%
19.2%

16.3%
15.5%
16.1%
26.3%

11.7%
11.6%
10.5%
10.1%

13.8%
14.1%
12.9%
14.5%

Table 3: Inputs and Expenses
1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

Input Quantities (000s)
Administrative Labor

3,542

3,614

3,589

3,675

4,116

4,468

3,834

Agent Labor

4,586

4,740

4,818

4,810

5,321

5,952

5,038

Materials & Bus Services

9,462

9,821

9,606

9,281

9,766

11,383

9,886

146,475

159,684

170,738

191,860

247,040

301,936

202,956

Input Prices
Administrative Labor

5.087

5.184

5.330

5.485

5.633

5.753

5.412

Agent Labor

4.373

4.401

4.455

4.551

4.677

4.637

4.516

Materials & Bus Services

2.907

2.874

2.979

3.110

3.271

3.221

3.060

Financial Capital

11.5%

12.3%

14.4%

14.1%

14.4%

14.2%

13.5%

Expenses
Administrative Labor

18,015

18,732

19,131

20,158

23,184

25,708

20,749

Agent Labor

20,055

20,863

21,468

21,890

24,886

27,597

22,750

Materials & Bus Services

27,501

28,229

28,615

28,866

31,945

36,663

30,256

Financial Capital

16,815

19,673

24,518

27,033

35,599

42,905

27,355

Percent of Total Expenses
Administrative Labor

21.9%

21.4%

20.4%

20.6%

20.1%

19.3%

20.5%

Agent Labor

24.3%

23.8%

22.9%

22.3%

21.5%

20.8%

22.5%

Materials & Bus Services

33.4%

32.3%

30.5%

29.5%

27.6%

27.6%

29.9%

Financial Capital

20.4%

22.5%

26.2%

27.6%

30.8%

32.3%

27.1%

Financial Capital: Average Price

23.1%

24.1%

25.0%

26.7%

29.4%

31.1%

27.1%

Financial Capital

Average

Table 4: Outputs and Revenues
1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

Output Quantities
Personal Short-Tail

14,699

16,218

17,628

20,186

21,667

24,958

19,226

Personal Long-Tail

43,701

45,001

44,523

47,020

47,491

54,852

47,098

Commercial Short-Tail

27,136

31,921

15,010

15,633

18,244

20,736

21,447

Commercial Long-Tail

40,486

36,332

47,310

45,755

45,521

50,769

44,362

415,508

438,402

450,330

483,926

569,515

653,153

501,806

Output Prices
Personal Short-Tail

0.370

0.323

0.259

0.198

0.245

0.246

0.274

Personal Long-Tail

0.251

0.236

0.308

0.240

0.334

0.337

0.284

Commercial Short-Tail

0.863

0.850

0.986

0.874

0.989

0.887

0.908

Commercial Long-Tail

0.450

0.524

0.642

0.685

0.727

0.690

0.620

Intermediation

7.0%

6.8%

7.5%

7.4%

7.7%

7.7%

7.3%

Revenues
Personal Short-Tail

5,442

5,241

4,574

4,005

5,300

6,133

5,260

Personal Long-Tail

10,987

10,627

13,726

11,282

15,866

18,477

13,397

Intermediation

Average

Commercial Short-Tail

23,412

27,139

14,804

13,670

18,041

18,395

19,480

Commercial Long-Tail

18,213

19,046

30,374

31,358

33,115

35,012

27,494

Intermediation
Intermediation: Average Price

28,976
30,531

29,909
32,214

33,805
33,090

35,880
35,559

43,918
41,848

50,027
47,993

36,873
36,873

Revenues: Percentages of Insurance Output
Personal Short-Tail
9.4%

8.4%

7.2%

6.6%

7.3%

7.9%

8.0%

Personal Long-Tail

18.9%

17.1%

21.6%

18.7%

21.9%

23.7%

20.4%

Commercial Short-Tail

40.3%

43.7%

23.3%

22.7%

24.9%

23.6%

29.7%

Commercial Long-Tail

31.4%

30.7%

47.8%

52.0%

45.8%

44.9%

41.9%

34.7%
34.0%

37.3%
37.0%

37.8%
36.0%

39.1%
37.5%

36.0%
36.0%

Revenues: Intermediation as Percentages of Total Output
Intermediation
Intermediation: Average Price

33.3%
35.1%

32.5%
35.0%

Table 5
Summary Statistics: Regression Explanatory Variables
1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

(Actual Capital - Optimal Capital)/Assets

0.133

0.134

0.134

0.146

0.145

0.154

0.141

Optimal Capital/Assets

0.135

0.134

0.133

0.119

0.134

0.130

0.131

Geographical Herfindahl Index

0.571

0.571

0.574

0.559

0.600

0.598

0.579

Line of Business Herfindahl Index

0.459

0.466

0.468

0.476

0.499

0.505

0.479

Reins Reserves Ceded/(Direct+Assumed)

0.317

0.321

0.319

0.321

0.302

0.304

0.314

(Stocks+Real Estate)/Assets

0.181

0.173

0.181

0.184

0.200

0.215

0.189

Ln(Assets)

18.23

18.27

18.30

18.38

18.20

18.32

18.28

Mutual Dummy Variable

0.455

0.437

0.448

0.452

0.466

0.475

0.455

Insurance Reserves/Losses Incurred

0.871

0.867

0.861

0.861

0.855

0.852

0.861

Standard Deviation of Book Return on Equity

0.079

0.072

0.071

0.072

0.075

0.081

0.075

One-year Premium Growth Rate

0.123

0.150

0.096

0.105

0.125

0.109

0.118

Personal Insurance Output/Total Ins. Output

0.391

0.382

0.390

0.404

0.368

0.363

0.383

Bests "A" Rating Indicator

0.645

0.628

0.644

0.633

0.578

0.597

0.621

Return on Equity After PH Dividends and Taxes

0.076

0.033

0.116

0.074

0.116

0.078

0.082

Return on Equity Before PH Dividends and Taxes

0.115

0.064

0.150

0.104

0.149

0.109

0.115

Note: Reported values are unweighted sample means. PH = policyholder.

Average

Table 6
Sample Mean Efficiency Results: All DMUs
Year

Number
of DMUs

Pure
Technical

Scale

Technical

Allocative

Cost

Revenue

1993

971

Mean:
Std Dev:

0.550
0.228

0.934
0.105

0.510
0.216

0.775
0.152

0.393
0.180

0.263
0.187

1994

956

Mean:
Std Dev:

0.596
0.225

0.905
0.127

0.535
0.211

0.795
0.138

0.422
0.175

0.271
0.188

1995

949

Mean:
Std Dev:

0.569
0.235

0.879
0.145

0.493
0.216

0.844
0.126

0.412
0.183

0.393
0.333

1996

920

Mean:
Std Dev:

0.578
0.229

0.907
0.125

0.519
0.209

0.824
0.154

0.425
0.184

0.234
0.185

1997

826

Mean:
Std Dev:

0.587
0.235

0.800
0.220

0.486
0.223

0.747
0.170

0.365
0.200

0.202
0.169

1998

770

Mean:
Std Dev:

0.581
0.241

0.889
0.136

0.529
0.217

0.799
0.212

0.419
0.196

0.246
0.187

Total

5,392

Mean:
Std Dev:

0.576
0.232

0.888
0.152

0.512
0.216

0.798
0.162

0.406
0.187

0.271
0.226

Table 7
A. Input Over/Under-Utilization: All DMUs
Year

Total
Labor

Materials
Services

Financial
Capital

1993

204.5%

40.9%

88.1%

1994

183.6%

38.6%

74.0%

1995

145.9%

71.0%

68.7%

1996

123.3%

47.0%

97.9%

1997

207.3%

97.7%

71.5%

1998

123.0%

67.2%

114.7%

Total

159.7%

57.2%

85.8%

Note: Over/under-utilization is the weighted average of actual
input usage divided by optimal input usage minus 1 times 100%.

B. Financial Capital Utilization: All DMUs
Year

Actual
Capital

Optimal
Capital

Amount
Overutilized

1993

142.2

75.6

66.6

1994

152.6

87.7

64.9

1995

161.9

96.0

65.9

1996

176.5

89.2

87.3

1997

204.3

119.1

85.2

1998

232.5

108.3

124.2

Average

178.3

96.0

82.4

Note: Entries in section B are in billions of dollars.

Table 8
Regression Models: Actual Capital / Optimal Capital
Inverse
OLS
Mills

Instr.
Vars

Geography Herfindahl

-0.184 **
0.057

-0.152 **
0.059

-0.150 *
0.060

Line of Business Herfindahl

-0.388 **
0.072

-0.190 *
0.084

-0.220 **
0.085

% of Reserves Reinsured

-0.309 **
0.080

-0.187 *
0.093

-0.176
0.094

% of Assets in Stocks and Real Estate

1.745 **
0.109

1.558 **
0.119

1.597 **
0.120

Ln(Assets)

-0.196 **
0.010

-0.287 **
0.018

-0.281 **
0.017

Mutual Dummy

-0.071
0.037

-0.167 **
0.038

-0.158 **
0.038

Insurance Reserves/Losses Incurred

-1.261 **
0.138

-1.318 **
0.181

-1.390 **
0.182

Standard Deviation of Book Return on Equity

-0.672 **
0.107

-0.440
0.345

-0.412
0.337

Percentage Change in Earned Premiums
Percentage of Business in Personal Lines

0.033
0.021
-1.678 **
0.054

Bests "A" Rating Indicator

0.040 **
0.015

0.039 *
0.015

-1.592 **
0.051

-1.598 **
0.052

1.162 **
0.159

0.842 **
0.148

1993 Intercept

7.774 **
0.242

9.072 **
0.444

8.762 **
0.309

1994 Intercept

7.838 **
0.242

9.156 **
0.449

8.842 **
0.314

1995 Intercept

7.810 **
0.242

9.121 **
0.449

8.804 **
0.313

1996 Intercept

8.018 **
0.243

9.339 **
0.448

9.027 **
0.312

1997 Intercept

7.722 **
0.242

9.073 **
0.452

8.763 **
0.317

1998 Intercept

7.821 **
0.243

9.166 **
0.451

8.856 **
0.315

R-Squared

0.846

0.851

0.846

Note: Standard errors are presented below the estimated coefficients.
** Significant at 1 percent level, * Significant at 5 percent level.
Regression models include 4,049 observations.

Table 9
Regression Models: Revenue Efficiency and Return on Equity
Revenue
Efficiency
OLS
(Actual Capital - Optimal Capital)/Assets

ROEBDT
OLS

ROEBDT
IV

-0.286 **
0.025

-0.087 **
0.023

-0.155 **
0.028

Optimal Capital/Assets

0.139 *
0.060

-0.678 **
0.057

-0.750 **
0.071

Geography Herfindahl

0.043 **
0.007

0.033 **
0.007

0.030 **
0.007

Line of Business Herfindahl

0.088 **
0.009

0.091 **
0.009

0.095 **
0.009

-0.073 **
0.010

-0.063 **
0.010

% of Reserves Reinsured

-0.012
0.010

% of Assets in Stocks and Real Estate

-0.044 **
0.015

0.058 **
0.014

0.071 **
0.016

0.026 **
0.001

0.019 **
0.001

0.006 *
0.003

Ln(Assets)
Mutual Dummy

-0.011 *
0.005

Insurance Reserves/Losses Incurred

0.012
0.018

Standard Deviation of Book Return on Equity

0.032 *
0.014

% Change in Earned Premiums

0.003
0.003

% of Business in Personal Lines

-0.095 **
0.008

-0.003
0.004

-0.009 *
0.004

-0.097 **
0.017

-0.123 **
0.019

0.023
0.013
-0.005
0.003
0.020 *
0.008

0.036 **
0.010
-0.004
0.004
0.032 **
0.009

Bests "A" Rating Indicator

0.078 **
0.015

Revenue Efficiency

0.094 **
0.036

1993 Intercept

-0.203 **
0.038

-0.092 *
0.036

0.096
0.051

1994 Intercept

-0.171 **
0.039

-0.144 **
0.036

0.043
0.051

1995 Intercept

-0.175 **
0.038

-0.062
0.036

0.124 *
0.050

1996 Intercept

-0.206 **
0.038

-0.118 **
0.036

0.072
0.051

1997 Intercept

-0.214 **
0.039

-0.065
0.036

0.129 *
0.052

1998 Intercept

-0.181 **
0.039

-0.110 **
0.037

0.081
0.051

R-Squared

0.827

0.519

0.536

Note: Standard errors are presented below the estimated coefficients. ROEBDT = return
on equity before policyholder dividends and taxes.
** Significant at 1 percent level, * Significant at 5 percent level.
Regression models include 4,049 observations.

Appendix
Controlling for the Endogeneity of the Best’s Rating Variable
As mentioned above, the Best’s rating variable used in our analysis is likely to be endogenously
determined with the dependent variables in our regression analysis – the ratio of actual to optimal capital,
revenue efficiency, and return on equity (ROE). Thus, the coefficient of this variable will be biased if the
endogeneity problem is not controlled.

We use two alternative approaches to control for endogeneity –

instrumental variables (IV) estimation and the use of inverse Mill’s ratios (IM).
To explain our approaches for adjusting for endogeneity, we specify the following model:

ÝA. 1Þ

b it = J vX bit + P it
6A
Y it = K vX Yit + Lb it + b it g5A
it + Ý1 ? b it Þgit + c it

ÝA. 2Þ

where
b it = 1 if firm i’s Best’s rating in period t is A or better and zero otherwise,
X bit = vector of explanatory variables in the Best’s rating equation,
X Yit = vector of explanatory variables in the equation for Y it

,

J and K = parameter vectors,
L= coefficient of the Best’s rating dummy variable,
6A
P it and c it = random error terms for equations (A.1) and (A.2), andgOA
it and git = random

error terms for firms with A ratings or better and firms with lower ratings, respectively.
The specification allows different error terms for firms with A ratings or better and firms with lower
ratings. In our analysis, there are three equations specified as (A.2), one each for the ratio of actual capital to
optimal capital, revenue efficiency, and return on equity.
The equation for the dichotomous Best’s rating variable (equation A.1), is estimated using maximum
likelihood probit analysis. Equation (A.2) contains explanatory variables as well as the Best’s rating variable.
Because the Best’s rating is likely to be endogenously determined along with Y it , the coefficient Lin (A.2) will

6A
be biased if the equation is estimated by ordinary least squares. Technically, the problem occurs if gOA
it and git

are correlated with P it , which is likely to occur if b it and Y it are jointly determined, i.e., if the Best’s rating
determines Y it and Y it simultaneously determines the Best’s rating. We use two methods to control for the
endogeneity of b it : instrumental variables (IV) and inverse Mill’s ratios.
The instrumental variables approach is to use as an instrument in estimating (A.2), the predicted
probability of having an A rating or better from equation (A.1). Denoting the standard normal distribution
function as F(6Þ, the predicted probability of having an A rating or better is F(J vX bit Þ, i.e., equation (A.1) is
viewed as a reduced form probit model and only exogenous variables are included in the vector X bit , i.e., Y it is
excluded from X bit .
6A
OA
The inverse Mill’s approach accounts for the presence of gOA
it and git in equation (A.2). If git and
6A
g6it A are correlated with P it , the conditional means E(gOA
it |b it = 1Þ and E(git |b it = 0Þ will not be equal to zero,

creating an estimation bias. To correct the problem, the conditional means are included as independent variables
in an augmented version of equation (A.2), yielding the following model:
?fÝJ vX b Þ

fÝJ vX b Þ

it
Y it = K vX Yit + Lb it + b it a OA
à+ Ý1 ? b it Þa 6it A ß1?FÝJvitX b Þ à+ c it
w ß
FÝJ vX b Þ
it

ÝA. 2Þv

it

where f(6Þ is the standard normal density function.
Estimating equation (A.2)’using ordinary least squares produces consistent parameter estimates.

Endnotes
1

Regulation, including the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) risk-based capital
system also specifies minimum levels of capital for insurers to remain in the market. \ However, the vast
majority of insurers maintain significantly highe r capital than required by risk-based capital rules (see
Cummins, Grace, and Phillips 1999).
2

Industry-wide capital grew at an average rate of 11 percent per year during our sample period.

3

A caveat in considering the market return and volatility data is that only a fraction of property-liability
insurers are publicly traded, so that results based on the traded firms may not generalize to the overall sample.
4

The index is the sum of the squares of the percentages of premiums written by state.

5

Ceded reserves are reserves an insurer transfers to reinsurers. \ Direct reserves represent the insurer's
obligations in the primary insurance market and assumed reserves reflect its obligations to other insurers as a
reinsurer.
6

For further discussion of the conglomeration and strategic focus hypotheses see Berger, Cummins, Weiss,
and Zi (2000).

7

DMUs were eliminated from the sample if they had zero or negative assets, premiums, or net worth.

8

The lines of business are classified as short and long-tail on the basis of their classification in Schedule P of
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) regulatory annual statement.
9

Because expenditures on physical capital such as computers and office space are a small proportion of total
insurer expenses, physical capital is included in the materials and business services category rather than being
treated separately.
10

Recall that technical efficiency is the product of pure technical and scale efficiency and that cost efficiency
is the product of technical and allocative efficiency, although it should be noted that these relationships hold
at the DMU level and only as an approximation for the averages.
11

The Best's indicator variable is not included in the revenue efficiency regression because we do not have any
reason to hypothesize that a firm's financial rating is a driver of its revenue efficiency. \ Rather, it is more
likely that the financial rating is determined by efficiency or by strong correlates of efficiency. \ Consequently,
including the Best's rating variable here would not be appropriate. \ When the equation was reestimated with
the Best's indicator variable included, the optimal capital to asset variable remained significant and positive
and the sub-optimal capital to asset ratio remained significant and negative and most of the other explanatory
variables retained the same signs and significances. Consequently, the conclusions of the analysis, most
importantly with respect to the capital to asset ratios, are robust to the inclusion ofthe Best's indicator
variable.
12

Robustness checks using return on equity after dividends but before taxes and return on equity after
dividends and taxes support the same conclusions regarding the effects of the optimal and sub-optimal capital
to asset ratios on firm performance.
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